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Several methodologies relevant to the development of a
safety program for the Korean Air Force were reviewed.
Methodologies considered included;
1) Control charts
2) System safety analysis
3) Critical incident technique.
Data collection methods applicable to accident analysis
were proposed.
Recommendations for the incorporation of these methods
into a safety program for the K.A.F. were developed.
The safety program described in the current thesis
possesses the potential for reducing overall operational
costs and maximizing aircraft availability. The end result
of such a program can only serve to increase operational
readiness and thereby maximize overall efficiency and
military capability of the K.A.F.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Safety is generally recognized as an essential part in
overall system operation. According to Lawrence (1976) safety
can be defined as a judgment of the acceptability of risk.
"Safety is the minimization of injury and loss resulting from
nondeliberate acts such as accidents and natural calamities"
(National Safety Council, 1973) .
A function is safe if its risks are judged to be acceptable
This definition emphasizes the relativity and judgmental
nature of the concept of safety. It also implies that two
very different activities are required for determining how
safe things are
:
a. Measuring risk, an objective but probabilistic pursuit.
b. Judging the acceptability of that risk (juding safety)
,
a matter of personal, social and economic value judgment.
System safety is required to prevent injury and damage
in system design. Hammer (1972) in his Handbook of System
and Product Safety suggests that injury or damage can result
from four fundamental causes or combinations thereof:
a. material failure.
b. human error.
c. adverse characteristics of a product.
d. unusual environmental conditions.
Recently, personnel concerned with accident prevention
have become more convinced that injury or damage from any

of those causes can be prevented or lessened through good
design and planning (Figures 1 and 2) . Figure 1 suggests
a model of the material failure/malfunction accident. The
approach to the investigation, analysis, and prevention of
mishaps caused by material failure/malfunction is FIRE
(material failure/malfunction, system inadequacy, and remedial
measure). They are defined as follows:
a. A material failure/malfunction (F) is a component or
system that 1) ceases to operate entirely, 2) operates,
but not as designed or intended, 3) operates as de-
signed, however, operational needs require enhanced
performance. A material failure/malfunction is con-
sidered for analysis only when it is judged to have
caused or contributed to the mishap, not resulted
from the mishap.
b. A system inadequacy (I) is an element of the aviation
system that did not operate as intended or designed.
An I is assigned only when it is judged to have
caused, allowed, or contributed to the occurrence
of an F. More than one I may be assigned to a given
F.
c. A remedial measure (RE) is an action required to correct
or at least reduce the operational impact of an I . The
RE may be directed at any command level for implan-
tation and is not to be restricted by current tech-
nology or budgetary, personnel, and equipment resources.
More than one RE may be recommended for a given I
.
Figure 2 presents a functional model of U.S. Army's Air-
craft Accident to the pilot error accident among human errors.
Items 1 through 8 are the basic elements of the aviation sys-
tem. When one or more of these elements is out of tolerance,
an overload (Item 9) is placed on the pilot's system role
(Item 10) in that he must continue to perform his normal tasks
while correcting or adjusting for the abnormal system condi-













Figure 1. Model of Mishap Caused by Material Failure/
Malfunction (G. Dwight Lindsey and William
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Figure 2. Model of Accident Involving Pilot Error
(Ricketson, 1974)
or occurs at a critical time, he makes errors (Item 11) in
his normal tasks and/or in handling the abnormal condition.
Most of these errors slip by without causing an accident
(Item 12) . But, when events or circumstances operate un-
favorably, the error leads to an accident (Item 13).
This approach views pilot error accidents as the result
of the pilot's system role being overloaded by inadequacies
of the pilot, other systems elements, or both. Accidents
describe a point in time to look for system inadequacies
.
This model exemplifies an attempt to approach accident causes
from a "systems" standpoint. Research has indicated that
human error, unlike hardware difficiency, is rarely the sole
factor in an accident. The applicability of this functional
12

model is not limited to pilot error accidents. It is a model
that may be used in any evaluation of a man-machine system.
The most commonly designated cause of accidents is human
error. In the past decade, more than 70% of Korean Air Force
aircraft accidents have been attributed to human error
(Aircraft Accident Data of Korean Air Force, 1980). In acci-
dents where material failure is recognized, it is often quite
possible to continue tearing down the equipment until the pre-
cise portion that failed is isolated and the cause of the
failure, whether it be corrosion, stress, faulty load con-
ceptualization, or other factors, can be determined and rede-
sign proposed. In case of human error, however, the static
statement that a human being failed provides no guidance to
future improvement. The need to reduce human error to its
basic constituents as a means of obtaining insight into the
causes of these failures has resulted in various approaches
to segmenting human behavior for analytical purposes.
According to Florio and Stafford (19 69) , when the primary
factor of an accident is attributed to human error the acci-




d. Improper habits and attitudes.
e. Unsafe behavior.
Each of these areas are discussed below:
13

Inadequate knowledge . Knowledge is the foundation for
understanding and the spring-board for the development of
desirable attitudes toward safe behavior. Ideally every
individual should learn and appreciate safety rules. Ade-
quate knowledge is vital if a person is to avoid hazardous
situations and react properly in such a situation. Also,
proper knowledge enables the individual to recognize and
evaluate dangerous situations (i.e., be aware of tolernace
limits of the system)
.
Insufficient skill . Attempting to perform tasks beyond
one's ability level creates high-risk situations; thus skill
level is an important determinant in accident prevention.
Skills are affected by many things, such as strength, fatigue,
attitudes, emotion, alcohol, vision, and others.
Environmental hazards . It is unrealistic to think that we
can create a perfectly safe environment. Despite our ina-
bility to control our environment completely, only a small
percentage of accidents are strictly attributed to environ-
mental factors. Good engineering practices with good design
reduce the environmental problems.
Improper habits and attitudes . Every worker should thoroughly
understand the development of attitudes and their possible
modifications
.
Unsafe behavior . Unsafe behavior is the end result of man's
failure to develop proper habits, attitudes, and knowledge
concerning safety. Safe behavior entails responding correctly
14

under all circumstances, and avoiding, when possible, high-
risk situations. There is no excuse for purposely engaing in
unsafe behavior.
Accidents are the result of many proximate and casual fac-
tors. These factors, or variables, interact to creat unsafe
acts and unsafe conditions, or both, which can terminate in
an accident causing injury, death, or property damage. An
unsafe act or condition alone, or in some combination, if
occurring at the right time may create an accident.
It is axiomatic that effective prevention must have a
focal point of application. This implies that the probable
cause of future accidents can be predicted. This, in turn,
implies that the causes of past accidents have been determined,
The cost of accidents is high. In the past decade from
1970, the cost of aircraft accidents in the Korean Air Force
approaches $50 million (not including piloes) [Aircraft
Accident Data of Korean Air Force, 1980] . As a country that
has small numbers of aircraft, this represents a tremendous
cost. In the case of the U.S. Navy/Marines , the total acci-
dent cost (Figure 3) is greater than the K.A.F. For ulti-
mate efficiency with maximum operational readiness and minimum
cost, more detailed accident prevention programs must be
followed. Accident prevention is best pursued within the
framework of a systematic program (Figures 4, 5, 6).
Figure 4 represents a model of the factors that may be
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LEVEL Of SAFETY PCnFOAMANCS
OPTIMUM LEVEL
Figure 5. An Optimal Level of Safety Performance



















Figure 6. Safety Improvement Flow Chart




differences will exist in actual practice because of the
different organizational structures. However, the model
indicates broadly the process that takes place.
A safety program, regardless of its characteristics or
goal, does cost money and require time. It is generally
accepted that as the level of safety performance increases,
the better will be the chances for reducing hazards, and
consequently, the frequency as well as severity of accidents.
Beyond a certain performance level, however, the expected
reduction in hazards starts to taper off and will not be of
appreciative magnitude to offset the cost associated with
high levels of safety activities. This is explained well
in Figure 5.
Figure 6 as presented in the overall safety improvement
effort through the accidents reduction approach, includes the
following basic steps.
a. Field data assembly.
In this step operating data are gathered on the system
to be analyzed to: acquaint the analyst with system opera-
ting methods, procedures and equipment; and obtain operating
data in the form of methods and time data for system operations.
In addition, accident data are gathered to provide a basis
for identifying accident problem areas and determining poten-
tial accident cost savings.
b. System definition.
Flow charting . Functional flow charts should be developed
to define the system. The charts serve as a guide for project
20

members, put them on the same level of thinking, and allow
standard methods and procedure references that all understand.
The charts should have a numbering system by function
to permit coding of accident data. The codes allow quick
reference to what work function was being performed when an
accident occurred, and are a means for computerized accident
information storage and retrieval.
Accident data . All accident data gathered are defined/
coded by work function and hazards or causes assigned to
accidents . Hazards definition is needed to indicate equip-
ment and system shortcomings with regard to safety.
c. Identifying problem areas.
Once hazards and safe data have been gathered, they
must then be examined for safety problem areas. The problem
areas should be defined so that concepts may be readily
developed.
d. Concept development.
Once safety problems have been defined, the next step
is to develop concepts that will eliminate or protect against
hazards and, as a result, reduce accidents.
e. Safety evaluation.
The effects on safety are determined by using the hazards
exposure data and estimating the reduction in hazards exposure
for all functions attributable to a new concept. The hazards
exposure reduction is an engineering estimate made by com-
paring current machines/systems with those proposed, and
noting by work function where hazards exposures have been
21

increased or decreased and by how much. The reduction ex-
pected in accidents is proportional to the reduction in the
hazard exposure.
f. Recommendations.
The last step is to consider evaluation results for con-
cepts and alternatives and make a decision for further study,
or choose the most attractive alternatives for design
development.
There are certain fundamental concepts and methods that,
if properly applied, can increase the probability of success.
Accident prevention is a composite of many related functions,
each of which must be given proper weight to assure a balanced
and productive program. It may be considered a closed-loop
system (Figure 7) comprising many feedback loops in which
information is collected by the responsible agency, is appro-
priately processed, is systematically analyzed, and then is
disseminated to those in a position to make use of the infor-
mation. The results of this dissemination are reevaluated in
the light of future accidents.
To put safety in its proper perspective, it must be first
realized that safety and efficiency are products of each
other. That is, the safe establishment is efficient. With
this in mind, safety then becomes a management problem and
not just the concern of the foreman or the supervisor.
Petersen (1978) suggests five basic principles of a safety










CLOSED LOOP FEEDBACK SYSTEM
Figure 7. Organizational Approach to Safety
(Zeller, 1978)
a. An unsafe act, an unsafe condition, and an accident
are all symptoms of failure in the management system.
b. Certain circumstances are predictive of severity of
accidents.
c. Safety should be managed like any other operational
function
.
d. An effective safety program will provide establishment
of responsibility and accountability.
e. The function of safety is to locate and define the
operational errors that allow accidents to occur.
This function can be carried out in two ways: 1) by
asking why accidents happen—searching for their root
causes—and 2) by asking whether certain known effec-
tive controls are being utilized.
23

Now comes the problem of safety measurement. W. Tarrants
(1979) discussed this problem as the problem that has existed
since the very beginning of organized attempts to control
accidents and their consequences. In its most elementary
form, measurement has been defined as "the process of assign-
ing numerals to objects according to rules" (Stevens, 1951).
When we apply this definition in the safety field, we are
quickly confronted with problems concerning what "objects" to
measure and what "rules" to follow.
The progress and maturity of a science or technology are
often judged by whatever success has been achieved in the use
of measures. Measurement, perhaps more than any other single
aspect, has been the principle stimulus of progress in all
professional fields. Measurement is the backbone of any
scientific approach to problem definition and solution. With-
out adequate measurement in the safety field we can not des-
cribe the safety state of our operations or determine whether
or not our safety programs are really accomplishing anything.
Sound measurement is an absolute prerequisite for control and
both are necessary for prediction.
The present thesis effort will 1) perform a literature
survey of the techniques to measure safety which are applica-
ble to measurement of flight safety, 2) emphasize the importance
of accident data collection for analyzing them, 3) refer to
K.A.F. accident data currently collected whether they are
applicable or not to measure flight safety, and finally
24







It has become apparent that there are many problems asso-
ciated with defining a universal criterion for safety measure-
ment and assessment. One of the chief concerns with the
conventional standards is the emphasis on accident data.
Many now recognize that this is more a reaction to existing
problems than action toward prevention or control of future
problems. Although experience can be a valuable teacher,
accident experience points to needless loss, and too often
doesn't give sufficient information for prevention.
Personal values present another problem in safety measure-
ment and assessment. Safety attitudes are strongly dependent
on the personal values of workers, line management, and
corporate management; effective safety measurement techniques
must be capable of addressing this behavioral aspect.
Applying statistical methods to the population of events
related to accidents is another problem area. Predictions
based on statistical analyses of accident data have been
described as unreliable due to the combination of variables,
rare events and small sample sizes. Often, attempts are
made to by-pass this obstacle by combining nonsimilar events
into a larger population universe.
Among the methods used for safety measurement are included
statistical quality control techniques, system safety analysis
techniques, critical incident technique, learning curve.
26

frequency and severity rate, safety sampling, double average
comparison technique. Here the author will describe the
methods which are applicable to flight safety measurement.
A. CONTROL CHARTS
Greenberg (1971) suggests that the techniques of statis-
tical quality control are ready-made tools for safety analy-
sis because the safety professional has common problems with
the quality inspector: both would like to be everywhere
simultaneously to detect changes; and both have to apply some
practical, effective approaches to their problems. Control
charts are used for this purpose. According to Brown (1976),
a control chart is a visual means by which an analyst judges
whether a process is in control or not. The measurement
plotted on the chart are those of any random variable. Hence
the frequency and severity of accidents, as well as any other
intermediate indicator of hazards, could be plotted. Judgments
based upon these plots determine if the process is in control
with respect to the random variable under consideration.
Figure 8 shows the typical layout of a control chart.
The units of the random variable are given on the vertical
scale, indicating that the height of the plotted point repre-
sents the value of the random variable for the indicated
time period. The time scale, given by horizontal line
shows when the value occurred
.
Measurement of central tendency and spread define the
expected concentration and range of the variable. Thus, if
27

X \ !()per control limil
Figure 8. Sample Control Chart
(Brown, D.B. [1976], p. 230)
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the variable behaves in a nonrandom way, we can conclude that
an outside influence is affecting the random variable. The
coininon way of identifying when this occurs is through the
use of an upper and a lower control limit. These are generally
placed at equal distances above and below the mean line.
The measured values as they are recorded in time are
plotted as indicated in Figure 8. A point falling above or
below the control limits, respectively, is indicative of an
out-of-control situation, and assignable causes are generally
sought. There are other indications of out-of-control situa-
tions, also. However, prior to discussing these, the means
for obtaining the control limits will be given.
The procedures for setting control limits are essentially
the same as those for setting the acceptance limits in a test
of hypothesis. The first step involves the establishment of
significance level a, that is, the probability of concluding
that the process is out of control when in fact it is in con-
trol. If methods of identifying causes are expensive and
the variable is not critical, a low probability can be tolerated
However, if an early indication of lack of control is necessary,
then a high probability of this error should be specified.
Once the value of a is determined, the next question involves
the definition of control. Quite often the state "out of con-
trol" occurs in one direction only, that is, upper control
limit would be required as it would in most cases of pollution
measurements (Figure 9) . Other monitoring of processes would
require both an upper and a lower control limit.
29

Figure 9. Sample of a Safety Control Chart Used in
Statistics Approach to Safety Evaluation
(Industrial Engineering^ Dec. 1975, p. 20)
In either case, the value of a chosen will represent the
total area of probability in the out-of -control portion of
the chart. The upper and lower control limits are obtained
depending upon the random variable, its distribution, and
the value of a chosen.
Brown (1976) suggests in the following example that the
frequency of accidents of a plant has a normal distribution
with a mean of 6 and a standard deviation of 1.5. Frequencies
30

for the first 6 months have been 4, 7, 5, 12, 8, and 6. Set
up a monthly control chart for frequency. Allow for a .05
probability of calling a point out of control when it is not.
In this example "out of control" is strictly in terms of
an upper limit. However, the analyst chooses to set up a
lower limit to provide possible evidence of a lowering of the
accident frequency. Thus the .05 probability will be divided,
.025 above the upper limit and .025 below the lower limit.
The upper limit becomes
U.L. = X + Z
„^c. a
. 025 X
= 6 + 1.96(1.5) = 8.94
and the lower limit is
. 025 X
= 6-1.96 (1.5) = 3.06
where
Z = ^^^ (which "standardizes" any normally









The control chart is given in Figure 10. The fourth month
was obviously out of control, and assignable causes should be
sought. In this example the assumption of normality should
be tested since it does not hold generally.
Figure 10. Control Chart for Example Described in
Text (Brown, 1976, p. 231)
The construction of the chart is simply a matter of apply-
ing hypothesis testing on a continuous basis. The primary
advantage is that continuous visual perception of the random
variable is maintained. This continuous picture enables the
analyst to make judgments not otherwise discernible. This
is not limited to the upper and lower control limits demon-
strated above. Other factors that the analyst can use as
indicators of abnormal operational behavior include:
32

a. Several points (four or more) in a row on one side
of the mean line. The probability of four consecutive points
4
on one side is approximately . 5 , or .0625.
b. Identifiable cycles. Here two or three years of history
may be required to identify a given month or other period
of time when the operation acts in an irregular manner.
c. Several points in a row, either monotonically increasing
or decreasing away from the mean line. The probability of
this type of trend is difficult to establish. However, since
these points are all on one side of the mean line, the proba-
bility will be considerably less than .5
, where n is the
number of points exhibiting this characteristic.
In quality-control situations, 3a control limits are
generally used, based on the 1-in-lOOO value of a under the
normal distribution assumption. The 2a and la lines may also
be set up, however, to help the analyst identify other out-
of-control indicators. For example, two points in a row
outside of 2a limits would have an approximate probability
2
of (.025) = .000625, which is about the same as the probability
of one point outside 3a limits, assuming normality. Although
control charts for safety applications should not be restricted
to the a = .001 value, the concept of intermediate lines to
identify irregularities is a good one.
B. SYSTEMS SAFETY ANALYSIS
To understand the systems safety analysis we should first
have a clear picture of what a system is. Worick (1975)
33

defines a system as an orderly arrangement of components which
are interrelated and which act and interact to perform some
task or function in a particular environment. The main points
to keep in mind are that a system is defined in terms of a
task or function, and that the components of a system are
interrelated, that is, each part affects the others. The
task or function which a system performs may be simple or
complex. Sometimes it is convenient to break up a complex
task into simpler tasks and consider subsystems of the larger
system. Subsystems consist of part of the components of the
overall system and perform a portion of the overall task
(Figure 11) . The components of a system can cover a wide
range including machines, tools, material, environmental fac-
tors, people, documents (such as operating instructions,
training manuals, or computer programs), and so on. As part
of a system, the components usually complement each other
but it is essential to recognize that a failure or malfunction
of any component can affect the other components and thus
degrade the perfoinnance of the task.
The sequential steps required in all system analyses
(Figure 12) are:
a. Recognition that a problem exists and that the solution
may be amenable to systems analysis techniques.
b. Definition of that problem in an appropriate form,
including a definition of objectives, requirements, and con-
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c. Definition of system itself t in terms of its hierarchi-
cal level, boundaries, interfaces, environments, functions,
and constituent subsystems and their interactions, usually
expressed in input/throughput/output terms. This iterative
process begins with gross approximations and works toward
minute preciseness, involving test and modification of the
original concept. The result should be a conceptual model
amenable to quantitative analysis.
d. Definition of performance criteria for the system as
a whole, for the various levels of organization, and for the
combination of its constituents.
e. Definition of alternative configurations and their
evaluation in terms of costs, effectiveness, state of develop-
ment, environmental constraints, etc.
f. Presentation of alternatives and tradeoff results
to the user. A number of choices should be presented in
order of preference.
g. Performance of ongoing, iterative engineering and human
factors analyses during systems development.
h. Analyses of operational systems to gether basic per-
formance data.
The importance of these preliminary steps cannot be over-
emphasized. As in any research, the analyst himself may
introduce bias in the form of poor problem formulation, not
understanding the system, or in not understanding the true
role of analysis. In some cases, it may not be known until
the system is complete whether the problem was defined correctly,
37

There are several methods which are used for the systems
analysis techniques, but the author will describe here the
fault tree and cost-effective analysis.
1. Fault Tree Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was developed mainly by
engineers who studied engineering systems in great detail,
with little or no contribution by mathematicians. A possible
explanation given by R.E. Barlow (1975) , J.B. Fussell (1975)
and N.D. Singpurwalla (197 5) is the fact that the construc-
tion of the fault tree, a basic step in fault tree analysis,
requires an intimate knowledge of the manner in which a sys-
tem is designed and operated. The mathematician's lack of
familiarity with the operation of systems, and perhaps their
preoccupation with mathematically well-defined problems, has
deterred their interest in fault tree analysis.
Brown (1976) developed Fault Tree and cost/benefit analy-
sis for choosing optimal safety alternatives. Brown shows
how negative utility amounts can be assigned to all possible
head events and the relevant possibilities multiplied by the
negative utilities. The results, which are expected negative
utility amounts, are called "measures of criticality"
.
Reductions in negative expected utility or criticality
are considered to be quantitative expressions of benefits or
effectiveness, and these are then related to costs to find
the optimal combination of safety alternatives for the deci-
sion maker's cost-benefit trade-off function.
38

Using Brown's methodology the safety manager should
first utilize the fault-tree analysis technique as a logical
approach to identify the areas in a system that are most
critical to safe operation.
According to R.E. Barlow (1975) and H.E. Lambert
(1975) , FTA is one of the principle methods of systems safety
analysis. FTA evolved in the aerospace industry in the early
1960 's. It was the result of a contract between the Air Force
Ballistics Systems Division and Bell Telephone Laboratories
for the study of inadvertent launch in the Minuteman ICBM
(Delong, 1970). After initial work at Bell Telephone Labora-
tories, development of fault tree continued at the Boeing
Company, where scientists devoted much effort to develop its
procedures farther and became its foremost proponents. The
principle of Boolean algebra (Appendix A) is applied for FTA.
Rogers (1971) has referred to the following six steps
that were used in applying the technique to the Minuteman
Program:
1. Define the undesired event.
2. Acquire complete understanding of the system.
3. Construct the fault tree diagram.
4. Collect quantitative data.
5. Evaluate fault tree probability.
6. Analyze computer results.
Undesired events requiring FTA are identified either
by inductive analysis, such as a preliminary hazard analysis.
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or by intuition. These events are usually undesired system
states that can occur as a result of subsystem functional
faults.
FTA is a detailed deductive analysis that usually
requires considerable system information. It can be a valua-
ble design tool. It can identify potential accidents in a
system design and can help to eliminate costly design changes
and retrofits. FTA can also be a diagnostic tool. It can
predict the most likely causes of system failure in the event
of a system breakdown.
A major difficulty with quantitative fault tree
evaluation is the lack of pertinent failure rate data. Even
in cases where the data are goodk it is not clear that we can
justify one system environment, data that were obtained in a
different system environment. Nevertheless, quantitative
evaluations are particularly valuable for comparing systems
designs that have similar components. The results are not as
sensitive to failure rate data as in an absolute determina-
tion of the system failure probability.
The goal of fault tree construction is to model the
system conditions that can result in the undesired event.
One of the advantages of manual fault tree construction is
that it forces the analyst to understand the system thoroughly
Before the construction of a fault tree can proceed, the
analyst must acquire a thorough understanding of the system.
In fact, a system description should be part of the analysis
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documentation. The analyst must carefully define the un-




A fault tree is a model that graphically and
logically represents the various combinations of possible
events, both fault and normal, occurring in a system that
leads to the top event. The term, event, denotes a dynamic
change of state that occurs to a system element. System ele-
ments include hardware, software, human and environmental
factors.
b. Event Symbols
The symbols shown in Figure 13 represent specific
types of fault and normal events in FTA. The rectangle defines
an event that is the output of a logic gate and is dependent
on the type of logic gate and the inputs to the gate. The
circle defines a basic inherent failure of a system element
when operated within its design specifications. It is there-
fore a primary failure, and is also referred to as a generic
failure. The diamond represents a failure, other than a pri-
mary failure that is purposely not developed further. The
switch event represents an event that is expected to occur
or to never occur because of design and normal conditions,
such as a phase change in a system. The conditional input
may be applied to any gate and describes a condition which
must be present to produce the output. For example, an
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Fault Event Basic Event
Undeveloped Event Switch Event
Transfer IN Transfer OUT Conditional Input
Figure 13. Event Symbols Used in Fault Tree Analysis
(Brown, D.B. [1976], p. 158 and Rodgers
,
W.P. [1971] , p. 41)
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order sequence of the inputs to an AND GATE may be described
as a condition input. The triangles are used as transfer
symbols. A line from the apex indicates a transfer in, and
a line from the side shows a transfer out.
c. Logic Gates
The fundamental logic gates for fault tree con-
struction are the OR and the AND gates. The OR gate des-
cribes a situation where the output event will exist if one
or more of the input events exist. The END gate describes
the logical operation that requires the coexistence of all
input events to produce the output event. the INHIBIT GATE
describes the relationship between one fault and another.
The input event causes the output event if the indicated con-
dition is satisfied. If the condition involves a specific
failure mode, it is represented by an oval. It is shown in
a rectangle if the condition described is one that may exist
anytime during the life of the system. The symbols for the
logic gates are shown in Figure 14.
d. Construction Methodology
The fault tree is so structured that the sequences
of events that lead to the undesired events are shown below
the top event and are logically related to the undesired
event by logical gates. The input events to each logic gate
that are also outputs of other logic gates at a lower level
are shown as rectangles . These events are developed further














Symbols for Logic Gates Used in





called "basic events". The basic events appear as circles
and diamonds on the bottom of the fault tree and represent
the limit of resolution of the fault tree. The structuring
process is used to develop fault tree flows in a fault tree
(Figure 15) when a system is examined on a functional basis,
that is, when failures of system elements are considered.
At this level, schematics, piping diagrams, process flow
sheets, etc., are examined for cause and effect types of
relationships to determine the subsystem and component fault
states that can contribute to the occurrence of the undesired
event.
e. Purpose of Fault Tree Construction
The fault tree, once constructed, serves as an
aid in determining the possible causes of an accident. When
properly used, the fault tree often leads to discovery of
failure combinations which otherwise might not have been
recognized as causes of the event being analyzed. The fault
tree can be used as a visual tool in communicating and supporting
decisions based on the analysis, such as determining the ade-
quacy of a system design. The fault tree provides a convenient
and efficient format helpful for either qualitative or quanti-
tative evaluation of the fault tree, such as determination
of the probability of the occurrence of the top event.
f. Evaluation of the Fault Tree
An objective of fault tree evaluation is to deter-























The output of in AND gate occurs
only if all the inputs exist.
The output of an OR gate occurs if any of the
inputs exist.
""Out-of-tolerance failure of a system element —
failure due to excessive operational or environmental
stress.
An inhibit gate is a special case of the





Figure 15. Levels of Fault Tree Development (Barlow,
R.E. and Lambert, H.E. [1975], p. 16)
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system design, i.e., will the proposed design suitably mini-
mize the probability of the occurrence of the top event.
If the system design is found inadequate, then the design is
upgraded by first identifying critical events (such as com-
ponent failures) that significantly contribute to the top
event. Cost constraints, contractual requirements, and other
factors limit the design changes that can be made. Therefore,
trade-off studies are necessary to determine what changes will
be incorporated to reduce the effect of the critical events.
When all design changes are made, the fault tree is re-
evaluated to determine if the revised design provides an
acceptable level of safety and/or reliability.
According to Brown (1976) the purpose of developing
a fault tree and quantifying it is to effectively allocate
the safety budget. To do this, the various alternative safety
investments are considered in light of their effect upon the
fault tree and the resulting head event. A measure of cost/
benefit is then determined for use in decision making. Before
completing the presentation of Brown's methodology some ter-
minology as given by Brown will be introduced,
g. Cost
Cost is defined as the dollar outlay to pay for
the incorporation of a device, method, procedure and so on
(henceforth called a countermeasure) into the industrial sys-
tem for a given unit period of exposure. Thus the cost of
devices that must be periodically recharged and/or replaced
is based on average costs for a given unit (e.g., a million
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man-hours (iranh) exposure period) . Permanent fixtures, such
as machine guards, can be prorated on the basis of the life
of the machine. The cost of educational programs can be
prorated, based upon their frequency. All countermeasures
must, for comparison purposes, have a common denominator,
h. Benefit
Benefit is the negative utility reduction.
Measure of benefit is the expected negative utility. There
is a negative utility (or cost in terms of dollars and personal
well-being) associated with accidents. This negative utility
depends upon the severity of the accident.
The expected negative utility of the head event
if it occurs can now be calculated by the following:
N




P^ = the probability of occurrence of the i




N = the number of severity classes,
U. = the negative utility associated with the
"" i^^ severity class.
An alternative method for calculating E would be
more appropriate if the values of negative utility from a
large number of past occurrences of the head event were
measured directly. Thus the expected negative utility
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associated with the head event would be obtained from the




Both equations above are equivalent under the
conditions that there are n severity classes (N = n) and that
the probability of each severity class is equivalent (P. = — )
.




This term is a vague term used in describing a
variety of applications. Here it is defined as the dollars
spent per negative utility reduction,
j . Criticality
A system is defined as critical if there is any
failure that will degrade the system beyond acceptable limits
and create a safety hazard. An absolute measure of criticality




C = the expected negative utility associated with
the head event in the given time or production
unit.
P = the head event probability (in occurrence/mmh)
E = the expected negative utility (in dollars/
occurrence or workday/occurrence etc.).
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k. Determination of Head-Event Probability
The value of P can be obtained assuming that a
proper unit of time or production has been deterinined to






N, = the number of occurrences of the head event
in the trials given by the chosen time or
production unit.
An alternative way to determine P is by using the
fault tree end branch probabilities. This is necessary if
the effect of alternative countermeasures is to be determined.
In the OR situation, any of the events will cause
the subsequent event to occur and, therefore, assuming inde-
pendence, the probability of occurrence of the subsequent
event is given by
n




q. = the probability of the i causal event.
n = the number of parallel branches.
In the AND situation, all the events must occur
for the subsequent event to occur and, therefore, assuming
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independence, the probability of occurrence of the subsequent
event is given by
n
A
i = l ^
Through a reiterative process the probability of
the head event can be determined from a knowledge of the
probabilities of the branch events. This is the value of P
which was given in the equation C = PE. A system modifica-
tion will produce a change in this value of expected negative
utility, thus providing the measure of benefit.
Brown (1976) gives various examples to demonstrate
the entire procedure.
2 . Example
Figure 16 is an example fault tree for developing
the head event "Chip in Eye (Grinding)". This particular fault
tree is to analyze the specific type of eye injury that might
be caused by the grinding operation. Those who might have
this accident fall into two mutually exclusive and all-
encompassing categories: (1) operators and (2) nonoperators
.
Further, assume that the accident will not occur if adequate
eye protection is worn. Therefore, the two events shown illus-
trate the first breakdown. The event "Operator Fails to Wear
Safety Glasses" has an abbreviated label which, if spelled out
in detail, would read "Operator Fails to Wear Safety Glasses











Figure 16. Fault Tree Illustrated
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The AND relationship asks the question: "What must
happen?" not "What could happen?" Four things must occur in
order for the nonoperator to be injured in this way. These
four are listed appropriately under the AND gate.
The event "Motive to Go into Area" analyzed into the
specific reasons. This eventis used under OR gate here.
In Figure 17 the probabilities of occurrence are given
I
for the end branch events for any million-man-hour period.
Suppose that records show that in the past there have been
10 accidents of this type, of which 7 were First Aid, 2 were
j
Temporary Total (man had to leave job) , and one resulted in
a Permanent Partial (caused permanent eye damage) . An example
of negativue utility schedule is given in Table I.
Table I





1 First Aid 20
2 Temporary Total 345




The value of negative utility need not be a dollar figure
if other intangibles, such as social costs, are to be
considered. For this example, however, First Aid was
a dollar value per case estimated. All other figures
are average costs per case given by the National
Safety Council, 'Accident Facts', 1971.
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P = Probability of /4 = 0522
/•. = S«verUy oi A - 133
Expected Negative Utility
= 17.38




The expected negative utility of this accident is
E = .7(20) + .2(345) + .1(2500) = 333
The probability of the OR gate given last:
P^ = 1 - (1 -0.05) (1 - .5) (1- .01) = 1 - .8935
= .1065
The probability of the AND gate is:
P^ = (.8) (.1065) (1) (.5) = .0426
The probability of the head event is:
P = 1 - (1 - .01) (1 - .0426) = 1 - (.99)(.9574)
= .0522
This is the probability of occurrence of the head event, in
any million manhours of exposure.
The criticality associated with the head event is:
C = P . E = (.0522) (333) = 17.38
This example will be pursued a bit further to deter-
mine how modifications on the fault tree are handled. If
money is spent to improve the safety of this system, one or
more of the basic event probabilities in the fault tree should
be reduced or else the expected severity should be reduced.
If not, either the expenditure should not be made, or else
the fault tree is incorrect. A reduction in the basic event
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probabilities will always reduce the probability of the head
event, P, and therefore it will also reduce the criticality,
C, of the event. The amount by which the criticality is
reduced will provide a measure of benefit for the change that
was made. Hence a measure of benefit can be estimated for any
safety investment.
Consider three proposed countermeasures to reduce the
probability of the head event "Grinding Chip in Eye" originally
presented in Figure 16. Assume the three alternatives were
given as in Table II.
Table II

















H and I to
zero
3 Both 1 and 2 $30 Same effects
as both 1
and 2





P = 1- (1 - 0.01) (1 - (0.8) (.1065) (1.0) (0.05)
= 1 - 0.9858 = 0.0142
C = P • E = (0.0142) (333) = 4.73
Savings = 17.38 - 4.73 = 12.65
Cost/Benefit = 25/12.65 = 1.98
Alternative 2
P = 1- (1 - 0.01) (1 - (0.8) (1 - (1-0) (1-0) (1-0.01) ) (1.0) (0.5)
)
= 1 - 0.986 = 0.014
C = (0.014) (333) = 4.66
Savings = 17.38 - 4.66 = 12.72
Cost/Benefit = 15/12.72 = 1.18
Alternative 3
P = 1 - (1 -0.01) (1 - (0.8) (1 - (1-0) (1-0) (1-0.01) ) (1.0) (0.05)
)
= 1 - 0.9896 = 0.0104
C = (0.0104) (333) = 3.46
Savings = 17.38 - 3.46 = 13.92
Cost/Benefit = 30/13.92 = 2.16.
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Summary for alternatives are shown in Table III.
Table III






1 $25 17.38 4.73 12.65 1.98
2 $15 17.38 4.66 12.72 1.18
3 $30 17.38 3.46 13.92 2.16
The best investment is the one with the lowest cost/
benefit figure. Alternative 2 is superior to the others in
terms of cost/benefit.
C. CRITICAL INCIDENT TECHNIQUE (CIT)
This technique is widely used as a method of discovering
and attempting to reduce or control hazardous situations be-
fore accidents occur. CIT examines previously experienced
difficulties by interviewing persons involved. It is based
on collecting information on hazards, near misses, and unsafe
conditions and practices from operationally experienced per-
sonnel. It can be used beneficially to investigate man-machine
relationships in past or existing systems and to use the
information learned during the development of new systems, or
for the modification and improvement of those already in
existence. The technique consists of interviewing personnel
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regarding involvements in accidents or near accidents; diffi-
culties, errors, and mistakes in operations; and conditions
that could cause mishaps. The surveys generally request
the persons interviewed to include their own experiences and
also experiences of other personnel whom they have actually
observed. The person is asked to describe all near misses
or critical mishaps that he can recall.
In effect, the CIT accomplishes the same end result as an
accident investigation: identification through personal in-
volvement of a hazard that has or could result in injury or
damage. When the witnesses who observed a mishap or near
miss, but were not participants, are added to those who were
involved, an extremely large population is available from which
information on accident causes can be derived.
Even isolated incidents reported by the technique can be
investigated to determine whether corrective action is necessary
or advantageous. However, when a large number of persons are
interviewed regarding similar types of equipment or operations,
similarities begin to appear in reports of hazards and near
misses. Where these indicate deficiencies, difficulties, or
other inadequacies, they can be accepted as indicators of
areas in which improvements are necessary in the design of a
product or system.
This technique provides a source of data on errors that
contribute to critical and catastrophic accidents, and obtains
information directly from operators, who are less reluctant
to admit errors in nonaccident situations than in accident
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situations. The CIT has been used in evaluation of aircraft
pilot safety and has proven beneficial as a qualitative
safety technique.
Fitts and Jones (1947) used this technique very effec-
tively after World War II when they conducted interviews with
Air Corps pilots on errors made in operating aircraft controls
and in reading aircraft instruments. Figure 18 indicates the
classifications of 460 pilot errors made in operating aircraft
controls. Over 8 percent of the errors reported can be con-
sidered as errors of design: design of controls, their
arrangements, and their locations.
Fitts and Jones also made numerous recommendations for
changes that would reduce human error, improve controls, and
increase system effectiveness. These recommendations, many
of which were incorporated in later aircraft and in human
engineering standards, are quoted here to illustrate benefits
that can be generated by this technique as a method of developing
accident prevention measures:
a. More than half of all errors in operating cockpit con-
trols can be attributed directly or indirectly to lack of
uniformity in the location and mode of operation of controls.
b. Substitution errors can be reduced by (a) uniform pattern
arrangement of controls; (b) shape-coding of control knobs;
(c) warning lights inside the appropriate feathering button;
and (d) adequate separation of controls.
c. Adjustment errors can be reduced by (a) automatic fuel
flow control; (b) simplified one-step operation of wheels and
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LiUBSl I r U r KJN E H ROHS confusing one control with another, or (ailinq to identify a control when
ii wcis iii'fiied
,1 UsiiK) ihtf wtuiiq throitif quadrant control (confusing mixture, prop pitch, throttle, etc)
t) CiKilusiiig tlap diifl whetl controls
c. Qpei.iiiiiy d conimi tor ihe wrong enqine (feathering button, ignition, mixture, prop pitch,
tluoMie, etc )
d FdiJKig to uieniify the Uniding light switch or confusing it with some other control
e Contusing other controls (alarm bell, bomb-bay door, carburetor heat, cockpit heater,
dK)(i()<it)le gas tanks, enit^rgency bomb release, engine heat, intercooler, oil bypass, oil colter














ADJUS TMENT E RRORS of'srating a control too slowly or too rapidly, moving a switch to the wrong
position or following the wrong sequence in operating several controls
a. Turning fuel s»Hector switch to the wrong tank
h Following wrciig sequence in raising or lowering wheels
c. Failing to obt.iin desired flap setting
d Adding power loo suddenly without proper change m trim
e. Failing to lock or unlock throttles properly
t Failing to roll m trim fast enough










FORGE TTING ERRORS, tailing to check, unlock, or use a control at the proper time
a. Taking off with flight controls locked (aileron, elevator, rudder, or all controls locked)
b. Forgetting generator or magneto switch
c. FoKietting to make proper engine or propeller control adjustments (mixture, prop pitch, etc.)
d Forgetting to lower lock or check landing gear
e. Taking off wiiti wrong trim settings
f Taking off withou t removing pitot cover
g. Forgetting to operate other controls (bomb-bay doors, bomb-rocket selector switch, coolant
shutter, flaps, auxiliary fuel pump, fuel selector, hydraulic selector, lights, PDI switch, pitoi
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Figure 18. Classification of 460 Errors Made by Pi






flaps; (c) easily accessible and continuously operable trim
controls; and (d) improved throttle locks.
d. Forgetting errors can be eliminated almost entirely by
adherence to uniform and "natural" directions of control
movement
.
e. Unintentional activation of controls can be remedied by
application of existing anthropometric data on body size
and use of a maximum reaching distance of 28 inches from the
shoulder for all controls used during critical procedures.
The CIT procedure was described by Tarrants as carried
out at one plant of the Westinghouse Company. The steps may
be summarized as follows:
a. A group of employees with previous experience and
involvement in manufacturing processes and equipment was
selected. Each person included was listed according to vari-
ous factors to produce as wide a range of experience as
possible. Representatives were selected randomly from each
factor group.
b. The participants were interviewed and informed of the
study and its objectives. They were given an opportunity to
withdraw from participation.
c. At the end of the interview the participant was given
a copy of the statement on the study and its objectives and
a list of typical incidents gathered at other plants. This
procedure was to stimulate the recall process.
d. Participants were asked to describe any incidents that
they could recall, whether or not they had resulted in injury
or property damage. They were asked whether they recalled
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any incident similar to those that had occurred at other
plants, as described on the list they had been provided.
e. Questioning was carried on until human errors or un-
safe conditions in any recalled incident could be described.
The 20 participants related 389 incidents of 117 differ-
ent types. Over 50 percent more potential accident causes
were found by this method than had been identified from acci-
dent records. One participant estimated that almost 70 per-
cent of the problems reported occurred every day, indicating
an almost constant exposure to danger. Once a potential
accident has been reported, the hazards are corrected so that
a real accident will not occur. As these hazards are eliminated
or reduced so should accident frequency and severity rates
.
The major deficiency of this method is that its effective-
ness will be dependent upon all employees reporting those
potential accidents (incidents) in which they are involved.
Usually employees will be reluctant to do so. They are worried
about their supervisors attitude, their own personal records
and/or spoiling the company's safety record. Thus data with
some degree of bias are introduced.
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III. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
Through the literature survey, several methods among the
existing safety measurement techniques have been discussed
for measurement of flight safety. From the above discussion
it is apparent that the measurement of flight safety is an
area for research and development which will allow major
improvement in overall flight safety programs,
A most important aspect in the development of an effective
safety program is collection and evaluation of data. The
primary goal of any safety program is to prevent accidents.
Accident prevention is best pursued within the framework of
a systematic program. Detailed and well-selected collection
of factual data is the first step in the development of an
effective safety effort. By means of an overall evaluation
of safety by analysis and dissemination of this data, acci-
dents can be predicted and prevented.
The Korean Air Force is currently collecting data on air-
craft accidents. Data categories collected are as follows.
a. Accident rate and flight time per model and year
b. Total accident rate, pilot and aircraft loss per year
c. Accidents by general factors (pilot, maintenance,
material, supervisor, etc.)
d. Accidents in detail per factors (e.g., pilot factor:
spin, disorientation, unusual, air collision, etc.)
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e. Major accidents per flight time (e.g., 400 ~ 500 hrs: 8,
900-1000 hrs: A, 1700-1800 hrs: 1, etc.)
f. Major accidents per flight phases (take off, climb,
in flight. Let Down, landing)
g. Major accidents per missions (Air to Air, Air to Ground,
Instrument Flying, etc.)
h. Major accidents per rank
i. Aircraft accident cost.
Many of the data categories listed above are useful and
lend themselves to analysis (Items a, b, e). There are, how-
ever, some major deficiencies in data being collected by the
Korean Air Force. From the accident prevention viewpoint
and for the analysis of pilot error, it would be better to
categorize the pilot errors of item c as follows:
a. Design-induced pilot factor (e.g., instruments that
can not be seen properly because of their location)
.
b. Operations-induced pilot factor (e.g., air traffic
control terminology)
.
c. Environment-influenced pilot factor (e.g., weather
phenomena such as fog or thunderstorms)
.
d. Innate pilot factor (e.g., poor technique, misuse of
controls, medical and psychological conditions).
Specifically, the data of items g and h are inadequate.
For example, item g must include flight time or sorties. That
is, accident rate must be calculated for each mission. Item
h must consider the total flight time and pilots of each rank.
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For example, suppose the cumulative number of pilots, flight
time, and accidents for 10 years are shown in Table IV.
Table IV
Example Data for Ranks by Pilots, Flight Time and Accidents
Rank 2nd Lt. 1st Lt. Capt. Maj . Lt. Col.
pilots 400 1,000 1,500 800 300
flight
time
40,000 150,000 450,000 160,000 30,000
acci-
dents
3 18 19 9 9
Then,
Accident rate =
(Number of pilots in each rank/total pilots]
X Accidents 100,000
Flight time of each rank
Total pilots = 400 + 1,000 + 1,500 + 800 + 300 = 4,000
Accident rate of
2nd Lt.
(400/4000) X 3 X 100,000 ^ ^^
40,000
By the same formula, accident rates of 1st Lt., Capt., Maj.,
and Lt. Col., are 3.0, 1.58, 1.13, and 2.25.
From the data collected above we can only use control
chart techniques because the data was not collected in detail.
But the problem is that it is difficult to evaluate the over-
all safety effectiveness by this method because the control
chart uses only the frequency or severity of accidents vs.
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time (year, month, or week) . Accidents must be considered
as multiple causation events, i.e., rarely is a single
factor solely responsible for the event.
The present thesis effort has been designed to examine
data currently collected by the K.A.F. and make recommendations




IV. APPROACH TO MEASUREMENT OF FLIGHT SAFETY
Several measurement techniques applicable to flight
safety were presented in the literature survey. The problem
is how should the data be collected to efficiently apply such
measurement techniques? The author will present several
methodologies to collect and apply data.
A. CONTROL CHARTS
The primary objective of this method is to show compari-
sons among accidents which occurred in a given period and to
visually indicate out of control situations by plotting fre-
quency of accidents vs. time (year, month, or week) and upper/
lower control limits. A point falling above or below the con-
trol limits, respectively, is indicative of an out-of-control
situation, and assignable causes are generally sought. To
measure flight safety, we actually need only the upper control
limit.
It is easy to collect these data. The K.A.F. does, in
fact, collect monthly and yearly aircraft accident data. In
addition, it may be advantageous to add daily and weekly
data to monthly and yearly statistics.
Example
1. Data for accident rate (major, minor, or major + minor)
per week (given period)
.
2. Pilot loss rate per year, month.
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If the above data was collected, it would be possible to
determine trends of accidents on a daily basis. In particu-
lar, we could analyze the accident factors (pilot error,
material failure, supervisor, maintenance, environment) from
item 1 by observing the upper control limit zone.
Analysis of Existing Data
The aircraft accident rate of the K.A.F. is as in Table V
Table V
K.A.F. Accident Rate by Year
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From the above data.
— r i 66.8 r r n
1= 1
s = 'J{1^\ - (j;x^)^/n]/n-l = 2.87
The t distribution is used. For a = 0.05,
U.L. = X + t — = 6.68 + t„ ^-.^ 2_^^
= 6.68 + 2.262x2_l82 ^ g^-73
/To
L.L. = X - t 4: = 6-68 - 2.262 X mZ
n-l,l-| /n /lO
= 4.63
The accidents of 70, 73, and 74 are out of the control
limit. So we have to analyze the accident causes of these
years to prevent or reduce accidents in the future. Also we
have to prepare accident prevention program according to the
outcome of analysis.
Let' s take a = .01.
U.L. = X + t .— = 6.68 + t„ QQ^ 2^^
n-1,1-2' *^^^ *'^10








- = 6.68 - 3.25 X 2.87
/lo
= 3.73
The accidents of 70 and 73 year are yet out of control
limit. The control chart is almost the same as test of
hypothesis
.
Hq: U = Uq
H^: y > Uq
The acceptance and rejection regions are illustrated in
Figure 20. Here assume that the hypothesis is true and
use the value of a to determine the "cut-off" point for
acceptance or rejection. a is the probability of rejection





Figure 20. Acceptance and Rejection Region
For Hq: y = u- and H, : y > y^, assuming that Hq is
true, the distribution is centered at y^. Now according to
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the definition of a we will accept a probability of rejecting
H- even though it is true.
Example
Aircraft accident rate of the K.A.F. was supposed to be
reduced up to average 5.0 from 19 70 to 1979. Was the acci-
dent level reduced significantly?
H- : y = Pq (Accident level was reduced significantly)
H, : u > ij» (Accident level was not reduced
significantly)




= 5.0 + tq
^ qc:
•
^-^^ (a = 0.05)
^/ -y^ /lo
= 5.0 + 1.833 •
-^1^ = 6.66
/lO
We know x = 6.68. Thus x > U.L. This means H-. is rejected
and H, : u > y^ is accepted. Therefore we can conclude that
the K.A.F. has not yet reduced the aircraft accident success-
fully within given period. If a increases, the value of the
U.L. decreases and the probability of acceptance H^ decreases
more.
B. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA)
Fault tree analysis can be used to improve flight safety
through the identification of safety critical items and make
cost effective recommendations for their improvement. The
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identification of failures which impact the safety of a com-
plex mechanical system of aircraft requires a disciplined
formal methodology capable of addressing the causes of failure
and failure interactions at low levels of complexity which
influence the entire system. FTA can provide such a disci-
plined methodology and also be applied to quantitatively
identify critical modes of failure (both hardware and human)
whose occurrence could cause a hazard in flight. The appli-
cation of FTA initially requires the definition of a system
and once the system is defined the basic events are identi-
fied by starting with the accident and looking for its cause
at a lower level of complexity. By repetition of this cause
and effect relationship, the most elementary cause is finally
deduced. The interconnections of the causal events with logic
symbols form the branches of the fault tree. The quantita-
tive evaluation of the probability of system failure requires
the collection of failure rate data from which basic proba-
bilities are determined. These basic event probabilities
are combined using rules of Boolean algebra to determine
criticality of each basic event. Based on relative criti-
calities, cost effectiveness techniques can be used to decrease
probabilities of basic hazards.
A fault tree is a failure analysis technique which analyzes
system failures beginning at the highest level of complexity
and ending at the lowest level of complexity. The upper most
event is identified as an accident which may have several
degrees of severity. The degree of severity is not identified
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on the fault tree diagram but is accounted for in the cost
effectiveness calculation. The tree construction is a logi-
cal process producing a graphical display of events such
that all possible causes of a particular failure are shown
below that failure. Subsystem failures are further subdivided
and depicted in greater detail until the bottom of the tree
is reached. The tree is structured to systematically show
contributory events and failures and their relationship to
each other and to the accident. Each component of the sub-
system capable of producing an event is examined and how its
failure would contribute to a mishap determined.
According to Hammer (197 2) , in the application of the
fault tree methodology the following assumptions are generally
made, concerning the characteristics of components, condi-
tions, actions and events:
a. Components, subsystems and similar items can have only
two conditional modes; they can either operate successfully
or fail. No operation is partially successful.
b. Basic failures are independent of each other.
c. Each item has a constant failure rate that conforms
to an exponential distribution.
The benefit of the generalized fault tree structure is
realized through the general applicability of the improvement
recommendations, derived from the fault tree analysis.
The author will draw a fault tree diagram based on the
K.A.F. aircraft accident data. The primary factors of K.A.F.
aircraft accidents in the 1970 's were classified into six
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categories, i.e., pilot, maintenance, material, supervisory,
environmental, and unknown factor. Fault tree must include
detailed fault factors from top structure to subsystem, but
K.A.F. data has not been collected in sufficient detail to
evaluate the most effective use of FTA. For example, material
factors of K.A.F. are shown in Table VI. What was the basic
event of flight control in Table VI? Was it pitch, yaw, or
roll failure? If the failure was due to yaw, what was the
basic event of yaw? Was it caused by wear, shock, or vibra-
tion? The fuel system can be included as a subsystem of
thrust control and also must be divided into subsystems.
Data presented in Table VI is inadequate for applying FTA.
Among the primary factors of K.A.F. data pilot, main-
tenance, supervisory, and environmental factors are human
error. Fault tree diagram of K.A.F. accident data is shown
in Appendix B. More subsystems and basic events were added
to illustrate a sample aircraft accident fault tree and develop
the methodology for collecting and applying data. A method
to collect data will be described below.
1. Data Collection
For FTA, the data is not confined only to major and
minor accidents. Incident and Forced/Precautionary Landing







Material Factors by Year of Accident (Major & Minor)
^"^-^(ear
Item ^"^--.^,^^
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 Total
Flight Control 1 1
Fuel System 1 1 1 1 1 2 7
Turbine Sect. 1 1
Caiipxessor
Section




Oil Syst-jRm 1 1
Elec. Systi=ra 1 1





Piston Rod 1 1
Flare Misfire 1 1
Flame Out 1 1
Fire 1 1 1 3





Basic events which will be contributed to accidents






Sample format of supervisory factors is shown in
Table VII. More detailed data to be collected is presented
in Section V.
2 . Development of an Equation for Corrective Action
Recommendations
This section concentrates on the development of an
equation by which to evaluate cost effectiveness in terms of
parameters derived from the fault tree analysis and parameters
which may be readily estimated from the data.
The cost effectiveness index provides a measure of
dollars saved per dollar spent in implementing recommenda-
tions. It is based on the projected percentage improvement
in criticality if the improvement recommendation is implemented
The cost effectiveness index is the ratio of cost savings to
improvement cost.



























































CE = cost effectiveness index
C^ = cost savings
C^ = improvement cost
The cost savings may be expressed in terms of the
difference in total accident cost achieved by implementing
the improvement recommendation. This may be expressed as:





Cg = cost savings
N = number of accidents
C, = cost of accident without improvement
C
^
= cost of accident with improvement
The general cost of a single accident may be expressed as




C„ = cost of a total lost
H
a. = probability of an accident being of severity i
y. = relative cost of an accident of severity i
i = 1 - major incident
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i = 2 - minor accident
i = 3 - incident
i = 4 - forced/precaution landing
This equation may be rationalized in terms of the
criticality representing the probability of an accident of
any severity occurring due to a given basic fault. The
probability of the accident being of severity i is then
(CR)(a.). The cost of an accident of severity i is (C„)(y.)
1 Hi
The cost likely to be incurred due to accidents of all
severities is the sum of the products of these terms as
expressed in the equation above.
The criticality after implementation of the improve-
ment recommendation may be expressed as:
CR' = (1-8) (CR) (4)
where
:
3 = percent improvement in criticality
The cost of an accident after implementation of the
improvement recommendation may then be expressed as:
C^^ = (1-6) (CR) (Cjj) I a^Y^ (5)
i
By substituting equations (3) and (5) into equation
(2) , an expression for cost savings is obtained in terms of
parameters which have known numerical values.
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S = ^(^A - ^AI^
= N{(CR) (Cj^)I<:x^Yi " (1-3) (CR) {C^)la.y }
i i "^
= N(CR) (C„){1 - (1-e) l^a.Y-H r 1 ' 1
Thus
Cg = N6(CR) (Cjj)j;a^Yi ^^^
An expression for the cost effectiveness ratio is




CE = Ne(CR) ^ I a.Y. (7)
^I i
In order to apply this formula we have to set up a
general criteria for each item.
a. Criticality (CR)
The author uses the definition of CR suggested
by Birnbaum (1975) . Let g be a function that computes the
probability of the top event in terms of the basic event
probabilities. To generate this function we need a Boolean
expression for the top event in terms of the Boolean variables
of the basic event. The outcome of each basic event at time






1 when basic event i has occurred at time t
otherwise
If the state of each basic event is random, the
probability that event i occurs by time t can be defined to
be F. (t) . If X. (t)dt is defined to be the probability that
event i occurs between t and t+dt, given that event i has




- j X. (t)dt
^
F^(t) = 1 - e ^
X. (t) is commonly referred to as the hazard or failure rate
at time t.
If we construct a fault tree where the top event
is system failure and the basic events are component failures,
then Birnbaum's definition of component importance becomes
8g{F(t)
}
= g{l. ,F(t)} -g{0. ,F(t) }
where g{F (t) } is the probability that the top event occurs
by time t. The above expression is the probability that the
system is in a state in which the functioning of component
i is critical: the system functions when i functions, the
system fails when i fails. The probability that the system
is in a state at time t in which component i is critical and
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that component i has failed by time t is the criticality of
the ith basic event, i.e..
CR = [g{l^,F(t) } - g{0^,F(t) }]F^(t)
.
Example
Assume that the fighter aircraft accident data
(including incident and forced/precaution landing) of the
K.A.F. was collected for a 10 year period and a fault tree
diagram was constructed the same as in Appendix B. From
this diagram, the number of basic event accidents due to
insufficient experience is 3. What is the basic event
failure probability, head event probability and basic event
criticality?
Before solving this problem, assume the following
data was collected.
Total flight time of
fighter aircraft 606,100 hr
Total sorties 586,600
Average flight time 1.033 hr
Assuming an exponential failure distribution, the failure
rate is:
' = 6067100 = 4.95.10-Vhr
Probability of basic event 'limited experience' is
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F^(t) = 1 - e"^^ = At = 4.95 xio"^ xi,033
= 5.11 X lo"^
For basic event 'inadequate training'.
^ = 6067100 = 3.30xio-Vhr
F^Ct) = At = 3.30 X lo"^ X 1.033
= 3.41 lO"^
Then, the probability of flight beyond capability P,. is
p^ = 1 - n (1 - F )
-L^ i=l ^
1 - (1 -5.1 X lo"^) (1 - 3.41 X lo"^)
8.52 X 10"^
In the same way
,
P-, = Probability of faulty flight plan
= 5.10 X lo"^
P,„ = Probability of inadequate W„ analysis
= 3.40 X lo"^
P. -. = Probability of poor crew coordination
= 5.10 X lo"^
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P,r = Probability of inadequate briefing
= 5.11 X lo"^
21
= Probability of supervisory error
1 - n (1 - p )
i=l ^^
1 - (1 -5.10 X lo""^) (1 - 3.40 X lo"^) (1 - 5.10 X 10"^)
(1 -8.52 xio"^) (1 -5.11 X lo"^)
= 2.72 X 10
-5
If we collected all of the other event data and
the probabilities of each event calculated as in Table VIII,




Maintenance 10.10 X lo"^
Environmental Condition 1.03 X 10"^
Psychophysiological
Disturbance 2.05 X lo"^
Flight Control 9.25 X 10"^
Thrust Control 8.55 X lo"^
Landing Gear 6.18 X 10~^
Unknown Crash 1.20 X 10"^
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Probability of pilot error = 5.80 x 10
-5
Probability of human error = 6.81 x 10
-4
Probability of material failure = 2.40 x 10
-4
Probability of head event failure = 3.20 x 10
Calculation of criticality:
If the ith component 'Insufficient Experience'
failed,
g{l. ,F(t) } = 3.20 X lo"^.
If the ith component 'Insufficient Experience'
didn't fail and the head event failure occurred, then




P = 1 - n (l-F.) = 1 - (1-0) (1 -3.41 X 10 ^)
L^ i=l ^
= 3.41 X lo"^
P^-L = 1 - (1 -5.10 X 10"^) (1 - 3.40 X 10"^) (1 -5.11 X 10"^)
• (1 -5.10 X 10"^) (1 - 3.41 X 10'^)
= 2.21 X 10"^
Finally we get the probability of head event failure as
-4
3.15 X 10 . Thus,
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CR = (3.20 X lo""* - 3.15 X lo""^) (5.11 X 10~^)
= 2.56 X lo"-'--^
b. Number of Accidents (N)
An estimate of the number of accidents in the
remaining service life of fighter aircraft in the K.A.F.
would be calculated if we knew the average sorties flown per
year and the projected remaining life of operation. Suppose
the average sorties flown per year was 58 660 and the average
operational life of fighter type aircraft was 8 years.
From the fault tree it was determined that the
probability of an accident of any type of basic event is
-4
3.20 X 10 . Then the number of accidents expected to occur
in the remaining operational life is:
N = (58660) (8) (3.20 X lo"^) = 150
Though the above value was derived by estimate, its absolute
value is unimportant since ranking of cost effective proce-
dures id based on a relative figure of merit.
c. Percent Improvement in Criticality (6).
The percent improvement achievable by implementing
suggested improvement recommendations for the particular fault
is based on an engineering judgment.
d. Ratio of Total Loss to Improvement Cost (p—
1
^I
Total loss is equivalent to the average acquisi-
tion cost of all types of fighter aircraft. For each
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improvement technique, estimates can be made of the cost to
implement the improvement as a fraction of the acquisition
cost, C^/Cj^.
e. Relative Cost of an Accident of Severity i (y •
)
The relative cost associated with a given accident
depends on its severity. Accident costs will be noimalized
with respect to the average of the manhours required to com-
plete repair or replacement of major damage for all kinds
of fighter aircraft.
Suppose we know the following data.
1. Major Damage Classification
Type of aircraft F-K F-M F-X F-Y F-Z
Manhours 500 600 700 800 900
2. Minor Damage Classification
Type of aircraft F-K F-M F-X F-Y F-Z
Manhours 200 180 150 120 50
Then the average of the manhours required to complete repair
or replacement of major damage for all types of aircraft is:
(500 + 600 + 700 + 800 + 911)/5 = 700
The average manhours of minor damage is 140, The relative
cost of a minor accident is then 140/700 = .2. The same ratio
can be applied in relating an incident to a minor accident
and a forced/precaution landing to an incident. Assume the
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relative cost of incident is 0.03 and forced/precaution landing
is 0.004 for calculation of COST effectiveness as an example.
f. Probability of an Accident Being of Severity i (a.)
It is often the case that basic events have
different probabilities of inducing accidents of varying
severity, i.e., some event will always result in a major
accident, whereas other events may induce a major accident,
minor accident, incident, or forced landing. The probabili-
ties depend on other interacting elements in the system.
Therefore, in arriving at a cost effectiveness index, the
criticality of a basic fault must be weighed to reflect its
impact on accident severity. This is achieved by introducing
a factor a. into the expression for cost savings to account
for the probability of a given accident severity. The evalua-
tion of this parameter requires an engineering judgment to
be made of the probabilities of a basic fault causing acci-
dents of varying severities.
Sample calculation of CE
Assume that the accident occurred from limited
experience (Basic event 1.8 of Appendix B) , The cause of
failure was due to "order to pilot beyond capability on
flight" . The corrective action recommended is an establish-
ment of experience criteria. The cost effectiveness of this
recommendation is:
From collected data and engineering judgment,
assume we have g = 70%, a, = 10%, a = 40%, a- = 40%, a, = 10%





CE = N (CR) (p^) I ay.
^1 i=l ^ ^
= 150x0.7x(2.56x lO"-^-^) X -i_ x (0.1 x l.O
+ 0.4x0.2 + 0.4x0.03 + 0.1x0.0004)
= 5.17 X 10"^
The relative cost effectiveness is obtained by
proportion of the above value to the most cost effective
item in the list, i.e., set the most cost effective item to
be 1.0. For example, suppose supervisory error in maintenance
has the greatest CE value of 65, then relative cost effec-
tiveness of 3.5 in Appendix B is 1 and accident due to limited
-7
-11
experience is 5.17 xio /65 = 7.9 xio . Example cost effec-
tiveness ranking is shown in Table IX. We can decide the
basic event fault is not critical and then it will be eliminated
from Table IX (e.g., if CR < lO"-^^) .
FTA was suggested as a method of system safety
analysis which can improve flight safety through identifica-
tion of safety critical items and make cost effective recom-
mendations. FTA is a detailed deductive analysis that usually
requires considerable system information. It can be a valua-
ble design tool. FTA can also be a diagnostic tool in that
it can predict the most likely causes of system failure in























































































































































































C. CRITICAL INCIDENT TECHNIQUE (CIT)
The CIT consists of a set of procedures for collecting
direct observations of human behavior in such a way as to
facilitate their potential usefulness in solving practical
problems. As a measure for accident research, it reveals
causal factors in terms of human errors and unsafe conditions
that lead to aircraft accidents and it provides more infor-
mation about accident causes and a more sensitive measure of
total accident performance than other available methods of
accident study.
The CIT has been used to collect both accident and near
accident data without any discrimination being made between
the two types of data. However, in particular cases the
investigator may confine his attention to one or the other
type of data.
By collection and categorization of common errors from
human factors data in aircraft operation, possible direction
of accident prevention and recommendation will be provided.
For example, if we collect data of specific experiences from
pilots in taking-off, flying an instrument, landings, using
controls and using instruments, then the data may provide
many factual incidents that can be used as a basis for
planning research on the design of instruments, controls,
training, and the arrangement of these within the cockpit.
To be useful the incidents must be detailed enough a) to
allow the investigator to make inferences and predictions
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about the behavior of the person involved and b) to leave
little doubt about the consequences of the behavior and the
effects of the incident.
The two primary steps included in the critical incident
procedure are
:
1 . Collection of the Data
The most important item for accident research is the
real data in detail. The CIT is frequently used to collect
data on observations previously made. This is usually satis-
factory when the incidents reported are fairly recent and the
observers were motivated to make detailed observations and
evaluations at the time the incident occurred.
The practical problem in collecting the data for des-
cribing an activity refers to the problem of how it should
be obtained from the observers. This applies especially to
the problem of collecting recalled data in the form of
critical incidents. Three procedures for collecting data
are described below.
a. Interviews
The use of trained personnel to explain to observers
precisely what data are desired and to record the incidents,
making sure that all necessary details are supplied, is
probably the most satisfactory data collection procedure.
This type of interview is somewhat different from the other
types of interview and a brief summary of the principle mis-




If the group becomes large, a questionnaire pro-
cedure is convenient.
c. Record Forms
One other procedure for collecting data is by
means of written records. There are two varieties of recording
one is to record details of incidents as they happen. This
situation is very similar to that described in connection with
obtaining incidents by interviews above.
A variation of this procedure is to record such
incidents on forms which describe most of the possible types
of incidents by placing a check or tally in the appropriate
place
.
As additional information becomes available on
the nature of the components which make up activities, obser-
vers may thus collect data more efficiently by using forms
for recording and classifying observations.
2 . Analyzing the Data
The collected data of a large sample of incidents
provides a functional description of the activity in terms
of specific behaviors. The purpose of the data analysis stage
is to summarize and describe the data in an efficient manner
so that it can be used effectively.
For analyzing the data we have to consider two pri-




a. Frame of Reference
There are countless ways in which a given set
of incidents can be classified. In selecting the general
nature of the classification, the principle consideration
should usually be that of the uses to be made of the data.
The preferred categories will be those believed to be most
valuable in using the statement of requirements. Other con-
siderations are ease and accuracy of classifying the data.
b. Category Formulation
The induction of categories from the basic data
in the form of incidents is a task requiring insight, experi-
ence, and judgment. The usual procedure is to sort a rela-
tively small sample of incidents into piles that are related
to the frame of reference selected. After these tentative
categories have been established, brief definitions of them
are made, and additional incidents are classified into them.
During this process, needs for redefinition and for the
development of new categories are noted. The tentative cate-
gories are modified as indicated and the process continued
until the incidents have been classified. The larger cate-
gories are subdivided into smaller groups and the incidents
that describe very nearly the same type of behavior are placed
together. The definition for all the categories and major
headings should then be re-examined in terms of the actual
incidents classified under each.
A major problem area in CIT involves actual data
collection. The following items will be applicable to interview
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or record form in order to collect human factors data in
aircraft operation.
1. Description of the occurrence
a. Aircraft
(1) Model
(2) Configuration when anomaly occurred (gear,
flaps, thrust, fuel, quantity, etc.)





(2) Elapsed time since departure from parking
area
(3) Phase of flight
(4) Geographic location
d. Nature of the anomaly (describe the deviation from
normal or expected performance as precisely as
possible)
e. Radio navigation facilities in use and type of
navigation
f. Detection of the anomaly (Identify the person
responsible for each pertinent decision, command,
action, communication or interaction with others)
(1) Who first noticed the deviation? (Aircraft
commander, air traffic controller, maintenance
personnel, or others (explain)). Who should
have?
(2) What brought it to his attention? What should
have?
g. Cockpit environment preceding the anomaly.
(1) Was there anything unusual about the operation?
(2) Were there any distractions immediately before
the anomaly occurred?
(3) What was the weather at the time of the
occurrence?
h. What actions immediately preceded the anomaly, in
order of occurrence?
(1) Did any of these actions contribute to the
anomaly?




(3) What information was the basis for the deci-
sions? Was the information correct?
i. Was there any indication before the anomaly that
it was going to occur or might occur? If so:
(1) What was the indication?
(2) Who noticed it?
(3) Was it noticed immediately? If not, why not?
Recovery following the occurrence
a. What happened after the anomaly occurred?
(1) What decisions were made?
(2) By whom?
(3) For what reasons?
b. What actions were taken to correct the deviation?
(1) By whom was each action initiated? When? Why?
c. What effect did each action have?
(1) Did it help recovery?
(2) Did it hinder recovery?
d. Did any complicating factors arise during the
recovery period? (After the initial deviation,
other events can occur while the crew is recovering
from the first one. Be careful to identify these.)
e. Was normal operation restored? How long did it take?
f. Was safety threatened at any time?
(1) If so, what was the nature of the threat?
(2) Was it recognized at the time?
(3) Who recognized it?
(4) How was it recognized?
(5) How long did it last?
(6) What was done to control or minimize the
threat?
(7) Could the threat have been controlled more
effectively?
Background
a. If pertinent, describe the history of the personnel
involved and of the airplane and facilities utilized
in this flight.
(1) Nutrition and rest: Describe meals as to time
eaten and type of food and sleeping time
.
(2) Were there any medical or physiological problems?
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(3) Describe the crew's rest and duty schedule
for this flight sequence. Was this flight
their scheduled activity?
a) Do the pilots believe the duty or rest
schedule was a factor?
b) Describe their activities during the
preceding day.
(4) Were there any problems within the flight
crew with respect to discipline, coordination,
ability, personality factors?
(5) Were there any other problems (ground support
personnel, controller, management, others)?
(6) Were any other factors pertinent during the
period prior to flight?
b. Describe in brief the history of this flight prior
to the occurrence. Emphasize any decisions, actions,
events or omissions which might have been related
to the later anomaly.
(1) Was servicing and ground support normal?
(2) Were there any supervisory problems?
(3) Were there any ground or flight delays?
(4) Were there any problems at the departure
airport?
(5) Were there any air traffic control or airways
facilities problems?
(6) Was weather a problem at any time? If so, how?
Analysis and recommendations
This section should contain only the opinions and
recommendations of the person reporting the occurrence.
a. Was the situation evaluated correctly when the
anomaly was detected?
(1) If so, were any special factors responsible?
(2) If not, why was the evaluation incorrect?
(3) Could anything have improved the accuracy of
the evaluation?
b. Was the detection of the anomaly as prompt as it
should have been?
(1) If so, were any special factors responsible?
(2) If not, why was there a delay in detection?




c. Was the recovery from the deviation the most
effective?
d. Was there any problem in flight crew management or
coordination? Describe any deficiencies, problems
or comments in detail.
e. Was the entire flight managed professionally and
effectively?
(1) If not/ what might have been done better?
f. Was Air Traffic Control involved in any way?
(1) If so, was the problem due to ATC handling or
instructions?
(2) If so, was there any flight crew misunder-
standing of ATC handling or instructions?
(3) Did ATC do anything to minimize the problem?
g. Was any airplane system involved?
(1) Did maintenance contribute to the problem?
h. Was this a fairly common problem?
i. Was pilot training adequate:
(1) To have prevented this occurrence?
(2) To correct or control it under these
circumstances?
(3) To cope with it under all circumstances?
j . Were any of the following involved in any way?
If so, how?
(1) Flight crew supervision?
(2) Flight dispatch?
(3) Flight or ground support?
(4) Other?
Supplement (for interviewer only)
a. Was the reporting person's memory entirely clear
as to the details of this occurrence? If not, in
what areas did he have difficulty remembering
details?
b. In your opinion, did this incident pose a threat
to flight safety? If so, how and why?
c. Add any additional comments or opinions you may
have as to the factors involved in this occurrence





After collecting the data by the methods given
above, we can analyze the data. The sample size must be as
large as possible for categorization. Table X is the classi-
fication of pilot-error experiences as a result of analyzing
the data. This is just an example to show how to analyze
the data.
In summary, the CIT is used as a method of dis-
covering and attempting to reduce or control hazardous situa-
tions before accidents occur.
In effect, the CIT accomplishes the same end
result as an accident investigation: identification through
personal involvement of a hazard that has or could result
in injury or damage. The CIT has been used in evaluation of
pilot safety and has proven beneficial as a qualitative
safety technique.
D. OTHER STATISTICAL METHODS
In general, accidents are not single causation events,
rather multivariate factors. So we can use many kinds of
statistical methods to analyze the data. Multiple regression
analysis and cluster analysis are widely used. Different
statistical methods can be applied to the collected data.
The following is an example of the use of statistical
methods. Suppose it is important to determine if there is
a statistically significant difference between the pilot




Example Classification of Pilot Error Experiences
Type of Error Number of
Errors
1 Errors in interpreting multi-revoluticn instruments
a. Errors involving an instrument which has more
than one pointer (e.g., misreading the altimeter)
b. Errors involving an instrument which has a
pointer and a rotating dial viewed through
a window (e.g., misreading the tachometer,
air-speed indicator)
2 Substitution errors
a. Mistaking one instrument for another
b. Confusing which engine is referred to by an
instrument
c. Difficulty in locating an instrument because
of unfamiliar arrangement of instinjments
3 Reversal errors (e.g., reversals in interpreting
the direction of bank shown in attitude indicator,
reversals in interpreting direction frcm oonpasses)
4 Errors due to illusions: Faulty interpretaticn of
the position of an aircraft because body sensaticns
do not agree with what the instruments shew
5 Using an instrument that is inoperative
6 Signal interpretaticn errors: Failure to notice
a warning light in the ai.rcraft, or confusing
one warning light with another
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(in this case, the "experience" and "inexperience" would have
to be defined) . Choose some time frame and let
h, = number of flight hours flown by experienced
pilots
h- = number of flight hours flown by inexperienced
pilots
a, = number of pilot factor accidents involving
experienced pilots
a^ = number of pilot factor accidents involving
inexperienced pilots.
Then the rates for experienced and inexperienced pilots are
(a xioo,000)/h, and (a x 100 , 000) /h , respectively. We
want to test the null hypothesis:
H-: There is no difference in accident potential
between experienced and inexperienced pilots
Testing H^ amounts to testing a hypothesis about the success
probability in a binomial distribution. Let a and h be the
number of accidents and time, respectively, for the group
with the larger accident rate (e.g., a = a, and h = h, , if
the experienced pilots had the higher rate).
Let
P = ^-TE^ ' P = h^Th^ ' n = a^^ + a^.
We will reject H_ if p and p differ too much. Compute
T = P(X>_a), where X has a binomial distribution with




T = ) -r-n ^T P (1 ~P)
.
^
1 ! (n-i) I ^ ^i=a
Let a be the significance level of the test (e.g., a = 0.05) .
If T > a/2, then accept Hp.. That is, we would conclude that
there is not sufficient evidence based on this data, to say
there is a difference between experienced and inexperienced
pilots. If T <_ a/2, then reject H^ and conclude (at signifi-
cance level a) that there is a difference between experienced
and inexperienced pilots.
The above test is an example of a two-sided test. It is
designed to answer the question, "Is there a difference
between experienced and inexperienced pilots?" A one-sided
test could be done to answer the question, "Are experienced
pilots safer?" The null hypothesis in this case would be:
H- : experienced pilots are not safer than
inexperienced pilots
For this case, let a = a, and h = h, , and compute T, p, p,
and n according to the same formulas as before. We will
reject H_ if p is much larger than p. If T > a, we accept
H-.. That is, we conclude that there is not sufficient evi-
dence, based on this data, to say that experienced pilots
are safer (with significance level a) . If T <_ a, then re-
ject H- and conclude (at significance level a) that experi-




Aircraft accidents are rarely caused by a single factor.
Generally, accidents are the end result of system deficien-
cies, human error and design deficiencies coming together
simultaneously. The most commonly designated cause of acci-
dents is human error. For flight safety, a systematic acci-
dent prevention program should include consideration of all
possible sources. Accident prevention is best pursued within
the framework of this program. There are certain fundamental
concepts and methods which, if properly applied, can increase
the probability of success in the determination of factors
contributing to an accident. Several methodologies for the
measurement of flight safety and data collection have been
proposed in this thesis for inclusion in the K.A.F. safety
program.
The primary goal of accident prevention progam is to
prevent mishaps. Therefore, the K.A.F. needs to develop
a safety program based on the following data collection and
analysis methods:
1. Develop a format which will describe each element
(e.g., pilot, maintenance, supervisory error, material
failure) in detail. For example the U.S.A.F. has
developed a system for accident data collection (see
Appendix C) which provides for a comprehensive con-
sideration of variables involved in flight safety.
The following elements are contained in the U.S.A.F.
data collection system:
a. Ground mishap report.
b. Aircraft flight mishap report.
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c. Aircraft maintenance and material report.
d. Life sciences report of an individual.
e. Psychophysiological and environmental factors.
f. Personal data.
2. K.A.F. needs to consider the application of the
critical incident technique (CIT) as described in
Section IV to collect and analyze data. CIT is
used in evaluation of flight safety and as a
qualitative safety technique.
3. Use the format of system safety hazard analysis (SSHA)
for fault tree analysis. In system safety analysis,
the results of SSHA should be used to determine what
safety requirements are needed to minimize and con-
trol hazards to an acceptable level. The SSHA should
be accomplished by a systematic evaluation of each
subsystem /component to determine how much each
element/subsystem could potentially contribute to
a specific hazard. A sample format of SSHA reporting
is shown in Appendix D.
4. Finally, the following fundamental data should be
filed in the computer for use in a safety analysis
and program evaluation.
Group data
(1) Total number of pilots engaged in flying by
month and year.
(2) Flight time of Command, Wing, and Squadron in
month and year by model.
(3) Total number of accidents in month and year by







(3) Date of birth
(4) Date of graduation from undergraduate
flight training
(5) Wing and Squadron assigned
(6) Total flight time




(8) Total instructor time
(9) Total weather/instrument time
(10) Number and type of accidents the individual
has had.
b. Accident data
(1) Name of personnel involved
(2) Date of occurrence
(3) Type of mission
(4) Phase of mission
(5) Duration of flight
(6) Type of accident
(7) Prime and contributing factor
(8) Days since last flight
(9) Hours flown in last 24 and 4 8 hours
(10) Sorties flown in last 24 and 4 8 hours
(11) Hours flown in last 7, 30, 60, and 90 days
(12) Total time in this aircraft type
In addition, similar data should be collected on main-
tainers , supervisors, air traffic controllers, etc.
Aircraft
(1) Model
(2) Total flight time
(3) Date of last major inspection
(4) Flight time since last major inspection
Accident research is a systematic, empirical, and critical
investigation of associated factors and their relationships
in an accident. For this research, reliable and valid acci-
dent data are necessary. If the data are collected in detail
and correctly by the formats and techniques proposed, it will
provide a convenient method for a researcher to use in the
development and application of a safety program. For example.
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the analysis of the variables or causal factors of aircraft
accident such as human error, material failure or malfunc-
tion, and adverse influences of the environment on man and
machine will allow the researcher to develop an analytical
model for a specific mishap. There are several multi-
variate statistical techniques (e.g., factor and component
analysis, cluster analysis, regression analysis, etc.) to
analyze the accident data. These techniques can be used to
determine significant interrelationships and to correct sys-
tem inadequacies (i.e., what caused or allowed the accident
to happen). Also, remedial actions (i.e., what can be done
to preclude the occurrence of an accident) will be proposed.
Finally, application of the findings and recommendations
are needed. Qualified investigators, researchers, and safety
officers are necessary at each level of organization (Figure
21) and a feedback system should exist between and within
each level. If a mishap occurs (here mishap includes major,
minor accident, incident, and near miss), it has to be inves-
tigated and reported by a reporting system to Air Force Head-
quarters Safety Section through the Command. In the H.Q.
Safety Section the data must be encoded, analyzed, and recommen-
dations made known by the dissemination of mishap results
and findings should be passed to Wing and Squadron through
the Command. The Squadron must then take action on this
recommendation. The recommendations including general trends








































Appendix E is a sample trend chart developed by the U.S.A.F,
and applicable to the K.A.F.
The safety program described in this thesis possesses
the potential for reducing overall operational costs and
maximizing aircraft availability. The end result of such a
program can only serve to increase operational readiness
and thereby maximize overall efficiency and military capa-




BOOLEAN LOGIC AND ITS APPLICATIONS
Boolean algebra was developed onqinallv for the study of svrribolic logic. Its rule? and expressions m mathematiral symbols
permit complicated prooosif'ons to be clarified and simplified. Boolean algebra is especially useful wfierp conrlitions can bf
expressed m no more than tv/o values, such as yes or no, true or false, on or off, up or down, go or no go It has (ound wkW'
application m areas other than symbolic logic. For example, it i$ used extensively in the design of computers and other
electromechanical assemblies incorporating large numbers of onoff (switching) circuits. Other uses are m probability analysis.
studies involving decision making, and more recently, in safety and fluidics. The chief difference between the various disciplines
in their employment of Boolean algebra is in notation and symbology. Since the information in this section presents basic
elements only, expressions most commonly found in safety analyses will be used
A sjt. is a group of objects having at least one characteristic in common. The set may be a collection of ob|Pcts. conditions.
events, symbols, ideas, or mathematical relationships. The unity of a set can be expressed by the number 1, and an empty
set, which contains none of these, by The numerals 1 and are not quantitative values: 1 * 1 does not equal 2 They am
merely symbols. There are no values between the two as there are in probability calculations. Set relationships are sometimes
illustrated by Venn diagrams. The following rectangle represents a set of elements that have an undefined common chararterisuc.
In addition, a subset has the cfiaract eristic A. All other elements in the set do not have the A characteristic and are cnnsidrred
being "not A," designated by A, A is the complement of A, and vice versa. It can be seen that the total of A and A is the lomplete
set, expressed mathematically by A + A = 1 , where the left side of the equation is the union of A and A The sign is read
"OR", and may be designated in mathematical expressions by other symbols, such as U.
(:© GD
The second diagram illustrates the concept of disjoint , or mutually exc lusive, sets. The elements of one subset arp not mriud^d m
the others, and therefore are not interrelated (other than being in the same set) In this case, however, because A, B and C
contain all the elements m the overall set. they are said to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive A + B + C ^ 1
The third diagram indicates that some elements of A also have B characteristics These are indicated hy A8, A B or A' B,
called the intersection of A and B The intersection contains all the elements with the characteristics of both A and B Whpn
all elements with the characteristic A are counted, those m AB will also be counted. The remaining diagrams m the ^ow iMtistrate
some of the relationships between union, intersection, and complement Numerous other relationships that ran bf> "mploved
in mathematical expressions have been developed, some of them having been designed as laws. These are listed below, with some
explanations on their meaning in Boolean logic.
RELATIONSHIP
A • 1 - A
A -
A * = A
A + 1 = 1
A - A
A A -
A *- A ' 1
A A - A
A + A = A
A B 8 A
LAW






The only portion within 1 that is both 1 and A is
that within A itself.
An impossible condition: if it is within the set. it
cannot be outside the set
The element m a Subset plus anything outsidp the snt
w.il have only the characteristics of the sub'Ji't
The whole, exi^ressed by 1 . rannot be ''»cee'l"<l
The comnlemp'lt of the comitiprnf-nl IS tbn id'm itsplf
An impossibility, a condition cannot he hnlh A .ind A
at the same time.
Those elements with a specific charartpnstir -md
those without It constitute the total <;pf
An identity
Also an identity
The plempnts having fjoth cfiar.irfpristirs havr ih"ni




A' B B»A The total o( those elements li<)vii'i) iiii- I h. II, Kt'T I -III
A or B will !)e the saine no nuiit-i it,p dkIi't 'ii
which they are expresseij
A(B C) - (A B)C Associative Laws The elements having all the chatac it;iisiK,s A. B jnl
C will have them no matter the ()r(ler in wtiM t\ rxprcssi'd
A t (B * C) = (A + Bl t- C The total of all the elements in any '.ubseis will be
the same no matter the order in wtiich expresst'd
A(B * C) = (A B) + (AC) Distributive Laws The union ot one suljset with two oUiers can alsn In'
expressed as the union of their intei st^ctions
A (B C) = (A * B) (A + C) The union of one subset with the intersection ot kvo
others can also be expressed by the intersection
of the unions of the common subset with the other
two.
A(A + Bl = A Absorption Laws A(A + B) = AA <• AB = A < AB sincf AA ^ A.
A + AB = Ad + B) = A since B is included m 1
A * (A B) = A A •• (AB) = A + AB - Ad ^ B) - A
AS = A 3 Ouallzation The complement of an intersection is the union of the
(de Morgan's) Laws individual complements.
A + 8 - AB The complement of the union is the intersection of the
complements.
Other useful identities are frequently used for simplification of complex Boolean equations Four of these are:
Identity Derivation
A + AB = A + B Using the Distributive Law; (A + A) (A + B) - A *- B
A(A + B) = AB Using the Distributive Law: A A + AB = AB
(A + B) (A + C) • (A + C) = AC < BC Expanding the last two terms_(A + 8) (AA + AC * AC + CO. CC = C,
AA = 0, AC + AC = C(A + A) = Cd ) = C, and C C = C,
remainder is (A + B)C, or AC + BC.
AB + AC + BC = AB + AC This can be simplified by adding ajerm such as A A The It^tt
hand side then becomes; AB * AC + BC(A + A| = AB 11 * C) ^
ACd + B) = AB + AC.
GATE (CONNECTIVE) SYMBOL EXPLANATION TRUT.H TABLE
The OR connective indicates that when one or
more of the inputs or governing conrlitions is
present, the statement will be true or an output
0^ ( \ will result. Conversely, the statement will be false
if, and only if, none of the governing conditions
is present.
The AND connective indicates that all of the
governing conditions or^nputs must be present
AND
I I
for a statement to be true If one of the conditions
I I
or inputs IS missing, the statement is false
A + B
The NOR connective may be considered a 'not OR"
state It indicates that when one or more of the
inputs IS present, the statement will be false or no
"
( I output will result. When none of the inputs, neither
A nor B. IS present, an output will result.





















The NAND connective indicates that when aM of the
inputs or governing conditions or inputs are ngi
present, the statement will be true or there will be
NAND
I I
an output When all of the inputs or governing
conditions are present, the statement will be false









FAULT TPvEE DIAGRAM FOR CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
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REPORTING FORMATS FOR DATA COLLECTION
GROUND MISHAP REPORT
I. I*A5C. BA1£ COCC * ROf^T tt ni*(.O0^H. COMO * •«•(. tuSMlTTtHO ^ S* m t I. MiSM*P r YPE
O^CfV* TIOMAL
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I
C 0*4 r M A C ' on JMAAIMI
; OM« A 1 r MO
SMV >PO"T/««CP
COML C A An< r A <AA MONTM OAV 0«- O* *&«>
itC C\.L AMCOU*
MISHAP LOCATIOM «. WCATMCn QJ MOT 4 »»CTOn
On •A>r ucicaist
o T MC n (t tpiMint
UlSHAP INVOLVeO
'IPC/ C " *LO«iOM
10. LOCAL TIMI LIOMT CONDITION
It. vMO'fit (WAa> H«ptMn«d and 'Ar;
1. *ensoN «epo«Teo as
. AatioNCO on«M. saic and como
€. SC«
COMPONENT r~| MOT APPLICABLC
AFACTIVt I OT-IP uf MIL fSl7»e(/l'>
'OPCISN MIL (Spaellr) rOPCION
NA» r£<-<n(f)
y ou TM/ » Tu FM w,PC 1
•ne-exiSTiMC phtsical/mCmtal limitations rj, MONC 1. OF'iccns Cni. .
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OThc* (Spmcllr) MOM-K A TC O
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PfPM tot Au rat' AT/ A(L. «OPAOAY 1 i.O»T rErxtr n».(
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AOCOUATl M OATC COMVLCTCO
a'KTY TnO (H»f*tilf m0 mn^ $irm ctmplmtum 4*im»)
O* UMIA^C ACT A. ACTIVITY AT TlUC O' MltHA*
HE9 • I YCAP
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a. CITA TION* iltuCO (Spmcllr)







C. LACOP eOCT p. MATCPIAL COCT «. TOTAL COAT
TOTAL mSMAP COST
O. TOTAL A» LO't
f 7rPA- A««»«. 4PA«« •««« 11(1*/
.ff COMOM/ »UMCTlOM AW M«« iXf^m ji. ai«
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AIRCRAFT FLIGHT MISHAP REPORT
iTo he filled out for onnitpat aircraft mvnlveii Ippri/pnate itetit i^i/i' snoutJ ^e 'ilteU out ot\ secondary aircraft j
MISHAP CLASS
a A D "
c Q oesT
4 UNIT CONTROt. NO » ACFT ASSICNMCNT/STATUS
cooc
PILOT(S) INVOLVED (FLIGHT CPEVVI
OPERATOR AT CONTROLS
A. CAST NAMC, INITIALS COMPONSN1
POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP lO. NATIONALITV
^ROW T S«AT LEFT SEAT REAR SCAT] RIGHr SCAT JUMP SCAT
r. MAJCOM. NAP, OIV. wa. so ASSIGNCO O. MAJCOM. NAP. OIV. WC. SO ATTACMCO POR PLYING
OTHER PILOT
A. LAST NAMC. INITIALS a. COMPONCN1
POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT Tl \< 6 OF MISHAP
^RONT SCAlj^ [left SCAT
I
[ REAR SEAT] j RIGHT SCAT JUMP SCAT
O NATIONALITY
P. MA.;COM. NAP. OIV. WC. SO ASSIGNCO G. MAJCOM, NAP. OIV. WO. SO ATTACMCO POR PLTING
OTHER PILOT
A. LAST NAMC. INITIALS • . COMPONENT
POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP
[pwowtscat]
I
lcpt seat] REAR SCAn RIGHT SCAT JUMP SCAT
O NATION ALIT Y
P. MAJCOM. NAP. OIV. wa. SQ ASSIGNCO O. MAJCOM. NAP. OIV. WO. SO ATTACMCO POR PLYING
OTHER PILOT
A. LAST NAMC. INITIALS . COMPONENT
POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP
WrONT SCAtI j LCPT scat! I RCAR SCAtI T RIGHT SCAT JUMP SCAT
O. NATIONALITY




I r HE rT TO rr AlWW A r% HhO CLCAR ANCC
OUAATION O^ FLIGHT I I. TYPC OP MISSION II ALTITUOC/CLC V ATIO^
l«. PMASC OP OPCRATION tS. TYPC OP MISHAP
f«. MCTCOROLOCIC AL CONOITIONS VMC IMULATCO IMC CDtRANSITION
niMC OON TOP QvPR IN IMC CONDITIONS
AIRFIELD OATA applicable TO TAKEOFF ANO LANDING MISHAPS OCCURRING WITHIN J MlLtS OF AIRFIELD
A PICLO CLCVATIOM II ml COMPOSITION OP RUNWAY
ASPHALT 3 CONCRCTC OOTMC R^JprCI ^S'/
il-rrti





a. LCNOTM OP OVCRRUM COMPOSITION OP OVCRRU»>
iSprcifyl TYPC usco locatio^
Qycs Qno
J' CONOITIONS APPECTINC OCCURENCE /I- "f example. t\ pe of utttnimerft or ttglitirxg approach used. oOsrructtont Oarrtrr airspeed, grvu
\rnthi, forerJ latuJingi
If ««,.« r/iu#i 1,'iir r'l''lf are inM<h , ,1 II h<tht (. re%%i *>-p,'rt lame utl,iririarton retjuirrj o'l ^Ji nonal thee I tor rach
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AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND MATERItL REPORT
,. .I.C.-r ,c,,.. ~.-.t. !• "1SS1C\ jESK:-. ANO SE'IES I«10SI
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UNDOVN •LEEO Al* UN«NO**l 'JEL UNANOHN
»• LOCATION Of INITIAL FiBE j
KNO*N »«0»A»lE «NO«N '•0»«»lE KNO«N »«OtAM.E
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CA.JSE 0« Ar»«IC 1 AHl. 1' "ONTAItuTl '0 IN-
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lit. PSYCMOPHYSIOLOGICii. ««0 ENY i ROKMEmTAL F*CTC.-!;
IHST^UCTIONS: Coi»ol»t» an •llorcupanit of aircraft, PHASES Of «l SMAP F4CT0B IMPORTANCE
• II iniurad perioni. and all prriona pa«iibl|> con- a - tcciOIair ot'iMUty.'r
trlbulini to (h» cauia of the -"ifhap. Suparvitory C • CSOPt CONTaiti^TlO
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LIFE SCItNCES REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN AN AF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT
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